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CIVIL RIGHTS/EMPLOYMENT LAW—STATES  CARRY  WEIGHT 
OF  EMPLOYMENT  DISCRIMINATION  PROTECTION: RESOLVING THE 
GROWING PROBLEM OF WEIGHT BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE 
INTRODUCTION 
Should an employer be allowed to refuse to hire “fat girls?”1 
Should a supervisor be allowed to monitor what an employee eats 
or call him a “fat slob” in front of clients and colleagues?2  Is it 
acceptable for a manager to refuse to promote a competent em­
ployee because he does not want a “stupid, fat broad” running his 
department?3  Should obese employees be forced to lose the weight 
or risk losing the job—even if their weight has nothing to do with 
their work?4  Not only are these scenarios representative of the 
kind of employment discrimination overweight workers face on a 
daily basis, they are situations from which employees have no legal 
protection under current federal and most state legislation. 
Weight discrimination lawsuits have been brought under the 
theories that weight bias resulting in disparate treatment5 or dispa­
1. Mary Carmichael, Do We Really Need a Law to Protect Fat Workers?, BOSTON 
GLOBE MAG., Aug. 5, 2007, at 26, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/maga­
zine/articles/2007/08/05/do_we_really_need_a_law_to_protect_fat_workers. 
2. Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 269 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991). 
3. Freire v. First Nat’l, No. 9644620, 1998 WL 1181751, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
July 22, 1998). 
4. A twenty-year veteran flight attendant who weighed 154 pounds at five-foot­
four was placed on a “formal weight program” for appearing overweight in her uniform 
and eventually suspended for not losing twelve pounds.  Underwood v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 78, 80-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).  Continental Airlines enforced 
weight regulations on female flight attendants to gain a competitive edge by offering 
passengers service by “thin, attractive women.”  Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 
F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
5. “Disparate treatment [occurs when an] employer . . . treats some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  Int’l 
Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (holding an employer wrongfully refused to 
hire the plaintiff because she had young children but did not apply the same standard to 
men). 
173 
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rate impact6 of a protected group is a violation of civil rights law, or, 
alternatively, weight bias is a violation of disability law based on the 
premise that excess weight is a handicap.7  Neither theory has been 
sufficient to protect individuals against weight-based discrimina­
tion.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bans discrimination 
based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion but does not 
protect weight as a stand-alone characteristic.8  The Rehabilitation 
Act of 19739 (RHA) and The Americans with Disabilities Act of 
199010 (ADA) prohibit employers from discriminating against em­
ployees with disabilities, but courts have rarely interpreted obesity 
as a disability or handicap.11  As a result, even if the court finds the 
6. Disparate impact involves employment practices that are facially neutral but 
affect one group more harshly than another and cannot be justified by business neces­
sity. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 429-30 (1971) (holding standardized employment tests that favored white appli­
cants over other applicants were impermissible under Title VII). See generally Dothard 
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements for correctional 
counselor position would exclude a disproportionate number of women compared to 
men). 
7. See, e.g., EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(employee brought disability claim alleging his employer improperly discharged him 
because of his obesity); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(a suspended firefighter sued his employer for intentionally discriminating against him 
based on his failure to meet weight regulation); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 805 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (police officers who were disciplined for failing to meet weight guidelines 
claimed they were regarded as disabled by the state); Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental 
Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1993) (a morbidly obese 
applicant was rejected for a position she had successfully held twice previously based on 
the belief her weight would prevent her from performing the duties of the job). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).  Under Title VII, weight has been protected 
under “plus” claims where the basis for discrimination is a protected characteristic, such 
as sex or race.  Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction for Title 
VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 209, 210 n.8 (2008) (citing Phillips, 400 U.S. at 542); see, e.g., 
Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 602 (finding airline’s weight regulations were discriminatory be­
cause they were only enforced against female employees); Hardy v. Stumpf, 37 Cal. 
App.3d 958, 964 (Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting a height and weight requirement for a police 
officer position because the standards effectively excluded eighty percent of women and 
were not proven to be “reasonable” and “necessary” to job duties). But see Marks v. 
Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding plaintiff’s dis­
crimination claim based on weight alone was not illegal under Title VII because the 
employer discriminated equally against overweight men and women).  To be unlawful, 
the basis of the discrimination must be a protected characteristic or the plus claim fails. 
9. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RHA), 29 U.S.C. § 701. 
10. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
11. The courts have “consistently rejected obesity as a disability protected by the 
ADA.”  EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D. Tex. 1996).  Obesity that 
is not caused by a physiological condition is not considered a disability under federal 
law.  Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 1993); see also Krein v. 
Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 796 (N.D. 1987) (holding that the 
“mere assertion that one is overweight or obese is not” enough to qualify a claimant for 
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employee was discriminated against because of his or her weight, 
the discrimination is not considered unlawful because weight is not 
a protected characteristic under current federal disability law.12 
This lack of legislative protection has allowed employees to be 
legally discriminated against in the workplace.  Workers are stigma­
tized because of their weight—subjected to derogatory comments 
and jokes on a regular basis.13  In a study conducted by Yale Uni­
versity, forty-three percent of overweight workers reported exper­
iencing weight bias from their supervisors,14 and more than half of 
the surveyed workers reported being harassed by colleagues.15 
statutory protection, and that “[s]omething more must be shown”); Phila. Elec. Co. v. 
Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 448 A.2d 701, 707 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) (“The condi­
tion of morbid obesity, alone, is not such a handicap or disability.”). 
12. For example, the California Supreme Court held that a grocery store discrimi­
nated against an applicant based on her obesity, but it was not unlawful because she did 
not prove her obesity was a handicap within the meaning of the statute. Cassista, 856 
P.2d at 1148, 1154. 
13. ROBERTA R. FRIEDMAN, RUDD  CENTER FOR  FOOD  POLICY & OBESITY, 
WEIGHT  BIAS: THE  NEED FOR  PUBLIC  POLICY 4 (2008) [hereinafter RUDD  REPORT], 
available at http://yaleruddcenter.org/resources/upload/docs/what/bias/weightbiaspolicy 
ruddreport.pdf.  A National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) survey 
found seventy-five percent of the respondents were subjected to criticism or teasing at 
work.  A. Myers & JC Rosen, Obesity Stigmatization and Coping: Relation to Mental 
Health Symptoms, Body Image, and Self-Esteem, 23 INT’L J. OBESITY 221, 221 (1999). 
One of the “many discriminatory remarks” an employee was subjected to at work was a 
supervisor’s comment that he “shook like jello” when he walked.  Blanchard, 23 
M.D.L.R. 23, 24 (Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination 2001), available at 2001 WL 
1602836, at *1. 
14. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.  Employees have reported weight-related R 
discrimination in a number of different contexts. See, e.g., Greene v. Seminole Elec. 
Coop., Inc., 701 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (a morbidly obese grounds 
keeper was “the subject of jokes and derision” and pressured into buying “diet cookies” 
from his supervisor (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lamoria v. Health Care & 
Ret. Corp., 584 N.W.2d 589, 590 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam), adopted, 593 
N.W.2d 699 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (special panel) (retirement home supervisors alleg­
edly had a “hit list” of employees they wanted to terminate, including those they per­
ceived as overweight (internal quotation marks omitted)); Francine Thistle Tyler & 
Laura Fraser, A Matter of Weight—Sizing Up Discrimination as Some Workers Find 
Laws, Attitudes Are Slow to Change, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at F1, available at 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19940821&slug=1926319 
(public relations director was told to wear only black or navy clothes to work based on 
the inference that the colors hid her size best). 
15. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 4; see, e.g., Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., R 
232 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (truck driver’s co-workers called him names and poked 
fun at his weight); Butterfield v. State, No. 96 Civ. 5144, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18676, at 
*15-16 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1998) (state corrections officer had his locker sprayed with 
cheese and an unknown substance slipped into his drink, the latter causing nausea and 
burning in his stomach). 
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Heavier workers earn less than their average-sized counterparts,16 
receive fewer raises,17 and are viewed as having low supervisory po­
tential.18  Employees have been denied health-insurance benefits, 
and seventeen percent of those surveyed reported being fired or 
pressured to resign because of their excess weight.19  Employees 
who fail to lose weight can be fired or suspended even if they per­
form their jobs well and their weight is unrelated to their job 
requirements.20 
The resulting shame and stigma from this kind of treatment 
results in social rejection, lower socio-economic status, and poor 
body image, which can lead to decreased physical activity, binge 
eating, and ultimately the onset of a vicious cycle of weight gain.21 
Considering that two out of three American adults are now over­
weight or obese, weight bias has affected, and will continue to af­
fect, millions.22 This dilemma may explain why weight 
discrimination in the workplace is gaining momentum as the focal 
16. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.  Obese women have been found to earn R 
twelve percent less than nonobese women.  Rebecca Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Bias, 
Discrimination, and Obesity, 9 OBESITY RES. 788, 790 (2001). 
17. THE COUNCIL ON SIZE & WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION, STATISTICS ON WEIGHT 
DISCRIMINATION: A WASTE OF TALENT, http://www.cswd.org/docs/stats.html [hereinaf­
ter COUNCIL] (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
18. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 4; see, e.g., Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 811 F. R 
Supp. 286, 289 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (route salesman testified he was told he would have to 
lose weight “if he wanted to go anywhere with the company”); Gimello v. Agency Rent-
A-Car Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 268 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (record-setting 
sales manager was not considered “promotable” by his supervisor because of his “size 
and weight”). 
19. Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 790. R 
20. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 4; Svetlana Shkolnikova, Weight Discrimina- R 
tion Could Be as Common as Racial Bias, USA TODAY, May 21, 2008, at 7D, available 
at http://usatoday.com/news/health/weightloss/2008-05-20-overweight-bias_N.htm.  For 
example, a public relations director raised large sums of money for a major medical 
center, established award-winning programs, and garnered national publicity in her first 
year on the job.  Tyler & Fraser, supra note 14.  Nevertheless, she was fired because R 
“[t]hings that should have changed didn’t change,” alluding to the fact that the em­
ployee had not lost weight. Id. 
21. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL 
TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 8 (2001) [herein­
after CALL TO  ACTION], available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/ 
calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf; see also RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 3; RM Puhl, T R 
Andreyeva, & Kelly D. Brownell, Perceptions of Weight Discrimination: Prevalence and 
Comparison to Race and Gender Discrimination in America, 32 INT’L J. OBESITY 1, 7 
(2008). 
22. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 2; see also Elizabeth E. Theran, “Free to Be R 
Arbitrary and . . . Capricious”: Weight-Based Discrimination and the Logic of American 
AntiDiscrimination Law,” 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 136 (2001) (holding 
weight bias has the ability to affect everyone). 
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point of a new civil rights movement.23  But what is the role of the 
legal system in that movement? 
In Massachusetts, a “slim” state with a 20.9% obesity rate,24 
House Representative Byron Rushing has proposed a bill that 
would add height and weight to current antidiscrimination laws, of­
fering legal protection from employment discrimination based on 
height and weight.25 House Bill 1850: An Act Making it Unlawful to 
Discriminate on the Basis of Weight and Height (hereinafter H.R. 
1850) would make it illegal for employers to consider an individ­
ual’s weight with respect to hiring decisions, compensation, job 
placement, and termination.26  In this respect, the legislation would 
place weight under the same legal protection as race, color, sex, 
religion, national origin, and disability.  Previous attempts went un­
noticed, but the bill, introduced in 200827 and resubmitted in 2009, 
has fifteen cosponsors and has received significant press coverage.28 
“What was clear,” Representative Rushing said, “is there is a grow­
ing number of people who think this should happen and an even 
larger number of people who think we should at least be talking 
about it.”29 
Currently, Michigan is the only state that offers legal protec­
tion against employment discrimination based on weight.30  Under 
23. SONDRA  SOLOVAY, TIPPING THE  SCALES OF  JUSTICE: FIGHTING  WEIGHT­
BASED DISCRIMINATION 29 (2000). 
24. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Obesity Trends: 
Trends by State 1985-2008, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html#/State (last vis­
ited Apr. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Trends by State].  Fifty-six percent of Massachusetts re­
sidents qualified as overweight in 2005.  Courtney N. Kubilis, Note, “Weighting” for 
Protection in Massachusetts: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in Employment, 42 SUF­
FOLK U. L. REV. 211, 211 (2008). 
25. H.R. 1850, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009); see also Kubilis, supra note 24, R 
at 211. 
26. H.R. 1850, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. 
27. Id. 
28. The cosponsors include fellow House Representatives Christine E. Canavan, 
Pam Richardson, Timothy J. Toomey, Jr., Matthew C. Patrick, Martha M. Walz, Benja­
min Swan, Stephen J. D’Amico, Willie Mae Allen, John W. Scibak, Kathi-Anne Rein-
stein, Ellen Story, Karen E. Spilka, Gloria L. Fox, Kay Khan, Carl M. Sciortino, Jr., and 
State Senator Susan C. Fargo. Id.; see also Carmichael, supra note 1. R 
29. Lisa Anderson, Lending Heft to an Anti-Bias Campaign: Massachusetts Bill 
Aims to Stem Discrimination Against the Overweight, but Some Don’t Want a ‘Green 
Light’ to Be Fat, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 28, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 7852996 (Westlaw). 
But see Gary Feldman & Judith Ashton, Op-Ed., Jumping the Gun on Weight Discrimi­
nation, BOSTON  GLOBE, June 2, 2007, at A11 (disagreeing with the bill), available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/06/02/jumping_ 
the_gun_on_weight_discrimination. 
30. The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“the Elliott-Larsen Act”), modeled after 
Title VII, prohibits “discriminatory practices, policies, and customs . . . based upon re­
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the Elliott-Larsen Act, a claimant only needs to prove a prima facie 
case of weight discrimination or provide direct evidence of discrimi­
nation31 to fall under the umbrella of statutory protection.32  Other 
states have applied broader interpretations of their civil rights and 
disability laws to afford obese employees legal protection.33  Some 
cities have enacted local ordinances that have successfully shielded 
employees from workplace weight discrimination,34 but the limited 
ligion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital 
status.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS  ANN. § 37.2101 (West 2001); see also Elizabeth Kristen, 
Addressing the Problem of Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 57, 
102 (2002); Kenneth P. Thom, Employment Discrimination Under the Elliott-Larsen 
Civil Rights Act: The State of the Statute, 1989 DET. C. L. REV. 1235, 1236 n.2 (1989) 
(stating that the Elliott-Larsen Act is “unique,” in part because it includes weight dis­
crimination, unlike federal statutes).  The District of Columbia Human Rights Act pro­
hibits discrimination on the basis of “personal appearance,” which includes weight. 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11(a) (LexisNexis 2001). 
31. See infra notes 187-190 and accompanying text for discussion of the elements R 
of a prima facie case and direct evidence of weight discrimination. 
32. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2101; see, e.g., Knowlton v. Levi’s of Kochville, 
Inc., No. 190677, 1997 WL 33345022, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 3, 1997).  In Michigan, 
the courts use the McDonnell Douglas test or the Gallaway test to establish burden of 
proof. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 805 (1973); Gallaway 
v. Chrysler Corp., 306 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); see also Byrnes v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 286, 293 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (holding an isolated comment about 
an employee’s weight was not enough to establish discrimination); Ross v. Beaumont 
Hosp., 687 F. Supp. 1115, 1124 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (finding a requirement that an em­
ployee seek treatment for obesity could be evidence that weight played a part in the 
employer’s decision to fire her). 
33. See, e.g., Clowes v. Terminix Int’l Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 802 (N.J. 1988) (holding 
that the general purpose of New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, as “remedial 
social legislation,” is to “guarantee civil rights”); State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. 
McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 699 (N.Y. 1985) (finding “nothing in [New 
York Executive Law section 292] or its legislative history” that would allow an em­
ployer to refuse to hire a qualified applicant simply because of “excessive weight”). 
34. For example, in Santa Cruz, California, when Toni Cassista lost her discrimi­
nation claim, see SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 233-34, the Santa Cruz City Council R 
passed an ordinance “to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons 
to be free from . . . discrimination based on . . . weight or physical characteristic.” 
SANTA  CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE, ch. 9.83.010 (1992), available at http://www.code 
publishing.com/CA/SantaCruz/.  In New York in December of 2008, the Common 
Council of the City of Binghamton passed civil rights legislation that included weight as 
a protected characteristic “to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all 
persons to be free from discrimination.” BINGHAMTON, N.Y., BINGHAMTON  HUMAN 
RIGHTS  LAW, CODE ch. 45, § 45-2 (2008), available at http://www.yaleruddcenter.org/ 
resources/upload/docs/what/bias/Binghamton%20Human%20Rights%20Law%20-%20 
Final%20Version.pdf.  San Francisco also prohibits weight from being used as a “mea­
sure of health [or] fitness” in employment decisions. CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRAN­
CISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES TO PROHIBIT WEIGHT 
AND  HEIGHT  DISCRIMINATION, § 5(C) (2001), available at www.sf-hrc.org/Modules/ 
ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=159.  Its ordinance gave legal leverage to Jennifer 
Portnick, a certified aerobics instructor, who was denied a Jazzercise franchise for not 
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range of legal protection creates inconsistency within the state and 
leaves employees outside city limits vulnerable.35  In this respect, 
state-wide legislation such as H.R. 1850 is a more logical, effective 
solution. 
After examining the merits of, and issues with, including 
weight as a protected characteristic under antidiscrimination law, 
this Note concludes that Massachusetts should add weight to its 
civil rights laws because federal civil rights and disability laws are 
inadequate in terms of legal protection. 
Section I will discuss the pervasive evidence of weight discrimi­
nation found at all levels of employment: the hiring process that 
disqualifies obese candidates on sight,36 the lack of promotion 
based on stereotypical beliefs that overweight workers lack supervi­
sory characteristics,37 the inequity in pay,38 and the harassment em­
ployees suffer at the hands of their coworkers and supervisors.39 
This Note will consider how the bias and stigma associated with 
being overweight negatively impacts workers professionally, finan­
cially, and socially, and concludes there is an immediate need for 
legislation to ensure equal employment opportunities for all. 
Section II will examine current federal legislation and discuss 
the role of weight in federally-protected antidiscrimination catego­
ries.  It will consider how the courts have treated obesity in a civil 
rights context: courts have offered protection against weight dis­
crimination if discrimination based on a protected characteristic 
such as sex or race is also found but have held that discrimination 
based on weight alone is not unlawful.40  Section II will also demon­
strate that under disability law, courts have rarely found that obes­
having a “fit appearance.” See Dan Ackman, The Case of the Fat Aerobics Instructor, 
FORBES.COM, May 9, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/09/0509portnick.html.  Jaz­
zercise is “a fusion of jazz dance, resistance training, Pilates, yoga, and kickboxing 
movements.”  Jazzercise Business Information, http://www.jazzercise.com/pdfs/ 
jazzercise_bus_info08.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
35. San Francisco has an ordinance prohibiting weight discrimination, but its 
neighboring city, Oakland, does not.  Sally E. Smith, And Justice for All?, BBW MAG., 
http://www.bbwmagazine.com/work_3_0018.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).  Author 
and attorney Sondra Solovay noted, “You land on one side of the Bay Bridge and it’s 
illegal for you to be discriminated against because of your weight.  You land on the 
other side of the bridge, and it’s a tough fight.” Id. 
36. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. R 
37. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. R 
38. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. R 
39. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. R 
40. See infra note 127. R 
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ity is a handicap within the meaning of the federal statutes.41 
Section II will conclude that federal law, as it currently exists, inad­
equately protects weight from employment discrimination. 
Finally, Section III will examine how some states and cities 
have protected their citizens from weight bias in the workplace de­
spite the legal limitations at the federal level.42  It will conclude that 
creating state legislation such as H.R. 1850 would allow the states to 
directly protect weight from being considered in employment deci­
sions to the detriment of workers.  H.R. 1850, if passed by Massa­
chusetts legislators, would be most effective as a legal basis for 
weight-discrimination claims.  Comparing the proposed Massachu­
setts bill to Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act, this Note will discuss 
how Michigan courts have interpreted the statute when considering 
a weight-discrimination case.43  It will conclude that the Elliott-Lar­
sen Act, which is based on existing federal legal frameworks, pro­
vides a sufficient model for Massachusetts to emulate and improve 
upon when deciding claims of weight bias. 
I. WEIGHT-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
Weight discrimination is prevalent in our society, affecting 
every facet of an individual’s professional life.44  A Yale study con­
ducted in 2007 found that overweight adults were twelve times 
more likely than adults who were not overweight to report weight-
based discrimination.45  Obese adults were thirty-seven times more 
likely to report discrimination,46 and severely (morbidly) obese 
41. See infra notes 165-170 and accompanying text. R 
42. See infra notes 212-224 and accompanying text. R 
43. See infra notes 184-204 and accompanying text. R 
44. Mark V. Roehling, Weight-Based Discrimination in Employment: Psychologi­
cal and Legal Aspects, 52 PERSONNEL  PSYCHOL. 969, 969 (1999); Lucy Wang, Weight 
Discrimination: One Size Fits All Remedy?, 117 YALE L.J. 1900, 1910 (2008). 
45. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.  The CDC defines the term “overweight” R 
as a body mass index of 25-29.9.  CDC, Obesity and Overweight for Professionals: De­
fining Overweight and Obesity, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/defining.htm 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2010).  Body mass index (BMI), for most people, is a reliable mea­
surement of body fat.  A person’s BMI is based on height and weight.  CDC, Healthy 
Weight: Adult BMI Calculator, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/healthyweight/ 
assessing/bmi/adult_BMI/english_bmi_calculator/bmi_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 
9, 2010). 
46. RUDD  REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.  “Obese” is defined as a BMI of 30 or R 
higher.  CDC, Obesity and Overweight for Professionals: Defining Overweight and 
Obesity, supra note 45.  It has also been defined as twenty percent above a person’s R 
ideal weight.  Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1151 n.12 (Cal. 1993); 
Roehling, supra note 44, at 971. R 
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adults were one hundred times more likely.47  Evidence of discrimi­
nation has been found at virtually every level in the cycle of em­
ployment, including the hiring process, placement, pay, promotions, 
disciplinary actions, and termination.48  Overweight applicants are 
less likely to be initially hired, regardless of their qualifications, es­
pecially for jobs that require personal interaction with clients or 
customers.49  This impediment to securing work increases the risk 
of poverty, preventing a person from having the means to afford 
healthier food.50  Weight bias also takes a psychological toll, de­
stroying the person’s confidence.51 
A. Ripping Away the Welcome Mat 
It began like an ordinary job search.  A job seeker applied for 
positions and conducted preliminary job interviews over the 
phone.52  The candidate was highly qualified with an impressive re­
47. RUDD  REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.  Severely obese (Grade III obesity) is R 
defined as having a BMI of 40 or higher. BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 417 (37th ed. 
1992).  It has also been defined as being one hundred pounds overweight or twice the 
normal, or desired, body weight for the person’s height. See Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of 
Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 20 n.1 (1st Cir. 1993). 
48. Roehling, supra note 44, at 982-83 (1999); see, e.g., Marks v. Nat’l Commc’ns R 
Ass’n, 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Telemarketer of the Year” told, “Lose 
the weight and you will get promoted”); State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. McDermott 
v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 696 (N.Y. 1985) (potential employer deemed computer 
programmer “medically not acceptable” because she was obese); Metro. Dade County 
v. Wolf, 274 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (upholding the termination of an 
overweight employee based on the belief he was “more likely to become disabled”). 
49. Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 789-90; see, e.g., Marks, 72 F. Supp. 2d at R 
326 (overweight employee at a telephone services company not promoted to a face-to­
face sales representative position because “presentation [was] extremely important”); 
Roehling, supra note 44, at 976 (finding that obese sales people were less likely to be R 
assigned to challenging sales territories when the job was conducted face-to-face). 
50. In 2008, Mississippi, the poorest U.S. state, had the highest obesity rate at 
thirty-three percent. See Trends by State, supra note 24; see also CALL TO  ACTION, R 
supra note 21, at 13-14 (“[W]omen of lower socioeconomic status . . . are approximately R 
[fifty] percent more likely to be obese . . . .” ); Wang, supra note 44, at 1915 (“Discrimi- R 
nation within . . . employment naturally reduces chances of economic success in life.”). 
51. CALL TO ACTION, supra note 21, at 8; RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 3; see R 
also Tyler & Fraser, supra note 14 (employee who was fired for not losing weight opted R 
not to bring a lawsuit because the experience “[took] a toll on her confidence and made 
it hard to fight back”); Smith, supra note 35 (rejected job applicant was deterred from R 
seeking other positions because she was “afraid of being discriminated against”). 
52. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 99; Teaching Tolerance, Sizing Up Weight-Based R 
Discrimination (May 3, 2002) [hereinafter Sizing Up Weight-Based Discrimination] (on 
file with author). 
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sume, and the prospective employer was eager to meet in person.53 
When she arrived for the interview, however, everything changed.54 
“[T]here was a look that would cross their faces when I came 
in,” the candidate observed about her potential employers, a senti­
ment echoed by her fellow overweight job seekers.55  “You can just 
see this wall come down,” another interviewee noted.56  Despite a 
professional wardrobe, a neat appearance, and a poised and confi­
dent demeanor, once the employer met the potential employee and 
“looked [her] up and down,”57 the interview became short and to 
the point; the suddenly unqualified candidate was “out the door.”58 
Weight discrimination often occurs in the hiring process, where 
the employers pass over qualified applicants in favor of lesser can­
didates simply based on appearance—and specifically based on 
weight.59  Some applicants even refuse to apply for jobs that require 
a “professional appearance,” believing their weight automatically 
excludes them in the mindset of the hiring employer.60  Their be­
liefs may be justified.  One study reports that sixteen percent of em­
ployers would not hire an obese person for any reason.61  The same 
study reports that another forty-four percent of employers would 
hire an obese person only under certain circumstances.62  Weight is 
53. Sizing Up Weight-Based Discrimination, supra note 52. R 
54. Id. 
55. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 99; see also Gauthier, 20 M.D.L.R. 41, 42 (Mass. R 
Comm’n Against Discrimination 1998) (complainant testifying that her interviewer had 
“a look of repulsion on his face that I wasn’t worth his time”). 
56. Mickey Meece, Mind-Set: Only the Svelte Need Apply, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
2000, at G1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57. Smith, supra note 35. R 
58. Meece, supra note 56; see Sizing Up Weight-Based Discrimination, supra R 
note 52. R 
59. COUNCIL, supra note 17.  For example, fifty-three-year-old Gail Gauthier, R 
weighing 250 pounds, alleged she was discriminated against when a car company hired a 
103-pound, twenty-two-year-old instead of her. Gauthier, 20 M.D.L.R. at 42-43. 
60. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 104; see, e.g., Underwood v. Trans World Airlines, R 
Inc., 710 F. Supp. 78, 80 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that an airline’s requirement that 
flight attendants’ weights “must result in satisfactory appearance in uniform” was di­
rected “at ensuring a competent professional business look” (citation and internal quo­
tation marks omitted)); Tyler & Fraser, supra note 14 (noting that “[a] person whose R 
weight is out of proportion with his or her height” is not considered to have a profes­
sional appearance). 
61. EVELYN B. KELLY, OBESITY 145 (2006); SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 104. R 
62. KELLY, supra note 61, at 145; SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 104. R 
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acknowledged as a factor in hiring decisions, especially in upper 
management positions.63 
Employers generally do not overtly state their reasons for re­
jecting the candidate, which makes it difficult to prove weight dis­
crimination.64  However, a survey conducted through the National 
Association for the Advancement of Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) re­
ported that over forty percent of male respondents and over sixty 
percent of female respondents believed they were not hired be­
cause of their size, and some remarked their entire job interview 
focused on their weight.65  Even if an applicant is able to prove dis­
crimination, unless he or she is fortunate enough to live in one of 
the few areas of the country that includes weight in its antidis­
crimination laws, there is little legal recourse.66 
B. In the Door, Off the Furniture 
Once an applicant is hired, weight bias has been shown to con­
tinue into the workplace.  Overweight employees are often viewed 
negatively.67  They are stereotyped as lazy, less competent, less pro­
ductive, unprofessional in appearance, and undisciplined, and are 
therefore less likely to receive promotions as a result of these be­
63. See, e.g., Meece, supra note 56 (national recruiting firm manager stating that R 
“[a]ppearance is always a consideration” because “[e]xecutives are always in front of 
[large] groups”). 
64. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 35.  Jamie Ferguson was told a department store R 
“desperately needed summer help” when she applied for a job. Id.  The store manager, 
however, “looked [her] up and down” and informed her there were no open positions. 
Id.  The applicant believed she was rejected because of her weight. Id.; see also Cassista 
v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Cal. 1993) (noting testimony that indicated 
employer was concerned about plaintiff’s weight, although employer had told plaintiff 
she was not hired because it had “hired people with more experience”). 
65. ESTHER ROTHBLUM ET AL., RESULTS OF THE NAAFA SURVEY ON EMPLOY­
MENT  DISCRIMINATION 4 (1989), available at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/~rothblum/ 
doc_pdf/weight/ResultsoftheNAAFASurvey.pdf; see Myers & Rosen, supra note 13, at R 
221. 
66. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fernandez, Teacher Says Fat, Fitness Can Mix, S.F. 
CHRON., Feb. 24, 2002, at A21.  Without San Francisco’s “fat and short” statute to sup­
port her case, Jennifer Portnick may not have been successful on her weight discrimina­
tion claim against Jazzercise. Id. 
67. One study found that “overweight job applicants [were] judged more harshly 
than ex-felons or applicants with a history of mental illness.”  Mark V. Roehling, Weight 
Discrimination in the American Workplace: Ethical Issues and Analysis, 40 J. BUS. ETH­
ICS 177, 177 (2002); see also Pinchock v. Gordon Food Serv., Inc., No. 200568, 1998 
Mich. App. LEXIS 2489, at *2-3 (Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1998) (noting that sales representa­
tive was told she “would look a lot better” if she lost weight and that she was offered a 
$500 incentive to lose fifty pounds (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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liefs.68  Seventy percent of NAAFA survey respondents claimed 
they were “questioned about their weight on the job or urged to 
lose weight,” and some employees stated they were deemed “bad 
role models.”69  Thirty percent of respondents stated they believe 
they were denied promotions or raises due to their size.70  “Nothing 
overt was ever said,” recalled Lynnda Collins, a multilingual con­
tract administrator of twelve years, who was passed over for an in­
ternational position in favor of a less qualified candidate who only 
spoke English, “but you just [knew what was] going on.”71  Over­
weight workers have watched promotions pass them by despite out­
standing credentials and proven productivity, yet they said nothing 
because they did not want to risk losing their jobs.72  When they are 
promoted, the terms and conditions of their employment have been 
less favorable than their predecessor.73 
Heavier workers are also vulnerable to on-the-job harassment 
and hostile work environments.74  Employees have reported being 
excluded from firm functions.75  They have been asked to refrain 
from sitting on office furniture for fear of breakage.76  Some em­
68. Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 789-90; see, e.g., Nedder v. Rivier College, R 
944 F. Supp. 111, 119 (D.N.H. 1996) (affirming jury’s finding that school supervisors 
believed that students perceived obese teachers as “less disciplined and less intelligent 
and . . . unsuitable role models”). 
69. ROTHBLUM, supra note 65, at 4. Jazzercise’s “fit appearance” requirement R 
was based on the rationale that “Jazzercise sells fitness,” so instructors must “look 
leaner than the public.”  Fernandez, supra note 66 (quoting Ann Rieke, Jazzercise Dis- R 
trict Manager, and Maureen Brown, Director of Franchise Programs and Services). 
This belief disqualified Jennifer Portnick, at 240 pounds, despite her demonstrated abil­
ity to do the job. Id.  Radio talk-show host Neal Boortz agreed, stating Portnick did not 
have “the right to be a lard butt and lead an exercise class.” Crossfire: Size Discrimina­
tion Laws: Weighing Pros, Cons (CNN television broadcast May 9, 2002), transcript 
available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/05/09/cf.crossfire/. 
70. ROTHBLUM, supra note 65, at 4. R 
71. Smith, supra note 35. R 
72. See id. 
73. See, e.g., Hazeldine v. Beverage Media, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 697, 699-700 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).  Grace Hazeldine, a morbidly obese employee, was promoted but was 
paid several thousand dollars less than her predecessor. Id.  She did not receive the 
officer’s title he held or use of a company car, she had to share her assistant, and she 
was denied direct access to her supervisor. Id. at 700. 
74. See, e.g., Butterfield v. New York, No. 96 Civ. 5144, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
18676, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1998).  A corrections officer who underwent gastric 
bypass surgery received harassing phone calls where the person yelled into the phone, 
pretended to vomit, or banged the receiver against a hard object. Id.  The calls were 
traced to his workplace. Id.  When he filed a complaint, he received a dead rat in the 
mail. Id. at *18. 
75. ROTHBLUM, supra note 65, at 4. R 
76. Id. 
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ployees felt they were treated as though they were mentally handi­
capped.77  When employees have complained, they have faced 
retaliation or termination.78 
C. Weighing In 
Despite the substantial evidence of bias and discrimination in 
the workplace, efforts to pass weight-discrimination laws like H.R. 
1850 have been controversial and primarily unsuccessful.79  Propo­
nents claim discrimination on the basis of weight creates serious 
medical, psychological, and economic consequences.80  Fat is one of 
“the last bastion[s] of acceptable discrimination,”81 and “the stigma 
against fat [people] is consistent and severe.”82  Despite extensive 
research demonstrating that a person’s propensity for excess weight 
is a complex combination of genetics, environment, and behavior,83 
and that most diets fail,84 there is a pervasive belief that weight is 
77. Id. 
78. See, e.g., Marks v. Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999).  In Marks, when a top-earning sales person complained that a “thinner and 
cuter” colleague was promoted over her, she was suspended and eventually terminated. 
Id.  In another situation, a plus-size sheriff’s deputy’s captain hung a poster of a fat cop 
eating a donut and stepping on a scale in the deputy’s office, visible to the entire squad 
room.  Smith, supra note 35.  The employee complained and was retaliated against R 
when she began “whistleblower” activities. Id.  She was eventually put on leave. Id. 
79. Representative Byron Rushing of Massachusetts has unsuccessfully proposed 
this type of legislation six times in the past twelve years as of 2008.  Anderson, supra 
note 29.  He proposed the bill again in 2009. R 
80. RUDD  REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.  “Obesity is [a]ssociated with an R 
[i]ncreased [r]isk of . . . psychological disorders such as depression . . . [and] psychologi­
cal difficulties due to social stigmatization.” CALL TO ACTION, supra note 21, at 9 tbl.1. R 
81. Tyler & Fraser, supra note 14 (quoting Sally Smith, the Executive Director of R 
NAAFA); see also Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 788. R 
82. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 25.  As a society, “we are surrounded by messages R 
that fatness is . . . unhealthy, . . . unsightly and immoral.” J. ERIC OLIVER, FAT POLIT­
ICS: THE  REAL  STORY  BEHIND  AMERICA’S  OBESITY  EPIDEMIC 2 (2006); see also 
Rebecca Puhl, Obesity Action Coalition, Weight Discrimination: A Socially Accept­
able Injustice, http://www.obesityaction.org/magazine/oacnews12/Obesity%20 
Discrimination.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (“Obesity is highly stigmatized in our 
society.”). 
83. CALL TO ACTION, supra note 21, at 1; see also Mark V. Roehling et al., Inves- R 
tigating the Validity of Stereotypes About Overweight Employees: The Relationship Be­
tween Body Weight and Normal Personality Traits, 33 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 392, 401 
(2008); CDC, Obesity and Overweight for Professionals: Causes, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
obesity/causes/index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). 
84. See David W. Haslam & W. Philip T. James, Obesity, 366 LANCET 1197, 1204 
(2005); Michigan.gov, Michigan Surgeon General, Why Diets Fail, http://www.michigan. 
gov/surgeongeneral/0,1607,7-216-33084_33097---,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2010); see 
also, e.g., Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826 828 (N.J. 2002).  Regina Viscik was 
overweight her entire life, despite trying dieting, pills, shots, and hospitalization. Id. 
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solely within the control of the individual.85  As a result, overweight 
people are blamed for their condition,86 becoming the victims of 
hostility and abuse at work, in public,87 in the media,88 and even in 
their own homes.89  By including weight as a protected category, 
proponents hope to reduce unfair treatment of overweight people 
and change the social stigma associated with obesity.90 
Employers, on the other hand, have good reason to want em­
ployees who maintain a healthy weight.  A recent report by the 
Conference Board, a nonprofit business research organization, esti­
mated obese employees cost U.S. private employers about forty-
five billion dollars annually in medical expenses and lost productiv­
ity.91  In a study conducted at Duke University, researchers “found 
the [heaviest] workers had 13 times more lost workdays due to 
work-related injuries” than their average-sized colleagues and 
seven times the amount of medical claims.92  As a result, some com­
panies are considering imposing higher health-insurance premiums 
on overweight employees unless they meet certain medical 
standards.93 
85. Roehling, supra note 83, at 401.  This widely held belief leads people to be- R 
lieve fat people do not care about themselves or lack self-control. Id. at 401-02; see, 
e.g., Greene v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (finding 
plaintiff’s weight “seemed to vary according to the motivation that he had for control­
ling [it]”). 
86. See OLIVER, supra note 82, at 6.  Weight is commonly used as a measure of a R 
person’s character. Id.  If a person is fat, she is lazy, irresponsible, and unable to care 
for herself. Id.  This moral connotation makes weight a “marker[ ] of social status 
whereby those with the resources or wherewithal to keep themselves thin rightly de­
serve their place at the top of the social ladder.” Id.; see also CALL TO ACTION, supra 
note 21, at XIII (agreeing that weight is a matter of personal responsibility but acknowl- R 
edging it is also a community responsibility). 
87. For example, a 419-pound woman reported that she was taking a walk when 
three men pulled up, threw garbage at her, and called her a “fat blimp.”  Sizing Up 
Weight-Based Discrimination, supra note 52. R 
88. See Crossfire, supra note 69. R 
89. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 25. R 
90. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. R 
91. LINDA  BARRINGTON & BARBARA  ROSEN, THE  CONFERENCE  BOARD, 
WEIGHTS & MEASURES: WHAT EMPLOYERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT OBESITY 4 (2008) 
[hereinafter THE CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT]. 
92. Associated Press, Fat Staff Eat into Profits, Study Finds, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
24, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/yourlife/health/diseases/articles/2007/04/ 
24/fat_staff_eat_into_profits_study_finds/; Truls Ostbye et al., Obesity and Workers’ 
Compensation, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 766, 769 (2007). 
93. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.  Starting in 2009, Alabama state employ- R 
ees will be required to receive medical screenings, including body mass indexing evalua­
tions.  Don Fernandez, Alabama ‘Obesity Penalty’ Stirs Debate: Plan Calls for State 
Employees to Pay More for Health Insurance if They Don’t Lose Weight, WEBMD 
HEALTH  NEWS, http://www.webmd.com/diet/news/20080825/alabama-obesity-penalty­
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The primary concern for opponents of weight discrimination 
law is the belief there will be an increase in meritless litigation.94 
However, the inclusion of weight as a protected trait under Michi­
gan’s Elliott-Larsen Act has resulted in few lawsuits, so the fear of 
increased litigation may prove to be baseless.95  On the other hand, 
with the rate of obesity rising dramatically over the past twenty 
years96 and reported weight bias increasing,97 there are significant 
legal and ideological arguments warranting the inclusion of weight 
as a protected characteristic from employment discrimination. 
II. WEIGHT-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 
One of the basic tenets in American society is that citizens are 
entitled to equal employment opportunities.98  Federal antidis­
crimination law was created to support this goal by removing “arti­
ficial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment”99 and to 
stirs-debate?page=3 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).  Obese employees will have a year to get 
in shape or they will be charged an extra twenty-five dollars a month for their health 
insurance. Id. 
94. Carmichael, supra note 1.  Republican analyst Todd Domke, a critic of the R 
legislation, stated, “[W]e might as well add colorblind, left-handed, allergic-to-cashews, 
and get it over with.”  Ken Maguire, Height, Weight Bias Eyed, ASSOCIATED  PRESS, 
May 17, 2007, available at http://www.telegram.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=FC/2007 
0518/NEWS/705180695/1116. 
95. RUDD  REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.  “Weight discrimination complaints ac- R 
counted for 1.2 percent of all complaints to Michigan’s Department of Civil Rights in 
2005 . . . .” THE CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 91, at 18.  As of 2006, there R 
have been fourteen published cases brought under the “height and weight” provision of 
the Act. ANNA  KIRKLAND, FAT  RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF  DIFFERENCE AND  PER­
SONHOOD 167 n.35 (2008).  Other states that have offered broader protection to obese 
people under their state civil rights and disability laws have not been inundated with 
weight-related litigation, a circumstance that indicates extending legal protection would 
not “open the floodgates.”  Natasha Benn, Obesity Lawsuits Loom, LEGAL TIMES, May 
21, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 28076241 (Westlaw). 
96. Trends by State, supra note 24. R 
97. “In the past decade, reported discrimination based on weight has increased 
sixty-six percent.”  Shkolnikova, supra note 20. R 
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no State shall “deny to any per­
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this language to mean that “all similarly situated persons should be treated 
alike.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
99. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  “The objective of Con­
gress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment opportu­
nities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor . . . white employees 
over other employees.” Id. at 429-30. “The Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that per­
sons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex.” 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971); see also Hardy v. Stumpf, 
112 Cal. Rptr. 739, 741 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding “[i]t is well settled under present law 
that a person . . . does have the right not to be discriminated against in employment”). 
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“neutralize widespread forms of prejudice that pervasively disad­
vantage persons based upon inaccurate judgments about their 
worth or capacities.”100  Private employers have long enjoyed the 
right to choose the kind of employees they want as long as they 
apply the same job requirements equally and do not engage in un­
lawful discriminatory practices.101  The goal of antidiscrimination 
law is “to insure every citizen the opportunity for the decent self-
respect that accompanies a job commensurate with one’s 
abilities.”102 
Accordingly, protected traits such as race, gender, national ori­
gin, religion, age, and disability have been historically recognized as 
worthy of protection by the legal system.103  Stereotypical beliefs 
that African-Americans lacked the ability to do certain jobs, that 
they were lazy, less intelligent, and personally responsible for their 
failures led to their displacement from skilled labor and resulted in 
poverty.104  Women were considered “emotionally incapable of 
leadership positions”105 and “placed in the less challenging, the less 
responsible and the less remunerative positions on the basis of their 
100. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidis­
crimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000).  In Texas, a federal district court held that 
an obese bus driver applicant was improperly discriminated against because of a “per­
ception of disability based on ‘myth, fear or stereotype.’”  EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 
F. Supp. 965, 979 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (quoting Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the 
American with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l) (2009)). 
101. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746-47 (C.D. Cal. 1984).  “[I]f 
a physical characteristic is not an ADA impairment, an employer is permitted to prefer 
one physical characteristic over another . . . .”  EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 
F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746-47 (holding “[f]or 
good or evil, private employers are generally free to be arbitrary and even capricious in 
determining whom to hire”). 
102. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 5 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 
2141.  “[T]he very purpose of title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifica­
tions, rather than on the basis of race or color.” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 (citing 110 
CONG. REC. 7247 (statement of Senators Clark and Case)); see Anna Kirkland, Think 
of the Hippopotamus: Rights Consciousness in the Fat Acceptance Movement, 42 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 397, 401 (2008) (stating antidiscrimination law conceptualizes the right of 
the individual to be judged on her capabilities, not irrelevant, stigmatizing traits). 
103. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 3 (“[Title VII] recognized the prevalence of dis­
criminatory employment practices in the United States and the need for Federal legisla­
tion to deal with the problem.”); see infra note 122. R 
104. KIRKLAND, supra note 95, at 63.  It was the plight of the African-American R 
worker in the economy that led to the prohibition of racial discrimination in employ­
ment.  United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979). 
105. Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1168 (1971) [hereinafter Employment 
Discrimination]. 
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sex alone.”106  They were paid less because they were less valued as 
employees.107  Discrimination based on these characteristics re­
sulted in inequitable employment opportunities and inferior status 
in society.108 
Weight bias has similarly disadvantaged individuals in the 
workplace.109  Weight is the fourth most prevalent type of discrimi­
nation in the country,110 but in some cases weight discrimination 
may be more prevalent than race or gender discrimination,111 and 
the effects may be greater.112  “Being fat is [considered] one of the 
most devastating social stigmas today,”113 and weight discrimina­
tion has the potential to directly harm a large portion of the 
population.114 
Weight discrimination is rooted in a false, stereotypical belief 
that obese people are lazy, less intelligent, and emotionally unsta­
106. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 4. 
107. See id.; Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt To Inter­
pret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1969, 17 DUKE L.J. 671, 672 n.8 (1968) (citing 
Hearings on H.R. 3861 and Related Bills Before the Special SubComm. on Labor of the 
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 95-108, 184-86, 241-47 
(1963)).  Because women employees had high turnover rates and absenteeism, they 
were considered more expensive to employ. Id. 
108. In 1962, House Report 1370 projected that, based on twelve days of hearings 
and testimony, fifty percent of U.S. citizens looking for work suffered employment op­
portunity discrimination based on “race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, or 
age.”  H.R. REP. NO. 87-1370, at 1 (1962). African-American workers made half the 
income of white workers, suffered higher unemployment levels, and received fewer ed­
ucational opportunities.  110 CONG. REC. 7218-21 (Apr. 8, 1964) (discussion between 
Senators Clark and Johnston). 
109. Three decades of obesity research has produced a body of literature that 
shows the marked discrimination fat workers face.  Janna Fikkan & Esther Rothblum, 
Weight Bias in Employment, in WEIGHT  BIAS: NATURE, CONSEQUENCES, AND  REME­
DIES 15 (Kelly D. Brownell et al. eds., 2005). 
110. Puhl, supra note 21, at 5; Wang, supra note 44, at 1919. R 
111. Roehling, supra note 44, at 983.  “Employers are more likely to discriminate R 
against people because of their weight than because of their sex or race.”  Meece, supra 
note 56 (quoting Mark Roehling). R 
112. Shkolnikova, supra note 20.  Seventeen percent of men and nine percent of R 
women reported racial discrimination in the past decade. Id.  Twelve percent of U.S. 
adults reported weight discrimination. Id.  Among the severely obese, forty-five per­
cent of women and twenty-eight percent of men reported weight discrimination. Id. 
African-American girls who experienced both weight and race discrimination reported 
the weight discrimination was more hurtful.  Wang, supra note 44, at 1920. R 
113. Wang, supra note 44, at 1902. R 
114. Id. at 1919.  “The obese . . . account for thirty-two percent of the . . . popula­
tion,” compared to racial minorities at twenty-five percent and so face a greater risk of 
discrimination. Id. 
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ble.115  And while other types of discrimination, such as discrimina­
tion based on race and sex, have become less acceptable to 
promulgate in public, society is openly prejudiced against the obese, 
with overweight women suffering the most discrimination.116  Over­
weight employees are rated less desirable as subordinates, co-work­
ers, and supervisors,117 and case law has demonstrated they are 
treated as such.118  In this regard, discrimination against obese em­
ployees has arguably diminished employment opportunities and the 
economic welfare of this group.119  Thus, like race and sex, the law 
should also protect people from weight discrimination. 
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not adequately 
protect weight from employment discrimination because the statute 
does not include weight as a protected characteristic standing 
alone.120  In enacting civil rights legislation, Congress sought to 
achieve equality in employment opportunities by removing obsta­
cles that had disadvantaged certain groups.121  A history of discrim­
ination against the group at issue122 and the relation of the 
discrimination to the individual’s abilities were important consider­
ations when determining characteristics that would receive legisla­
115. See Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 789-90; Roehling, supra note 83, R 
at 392. 
116. Puhl, supra note 21, at 1; Wang, supra note 44, at 1902. R 
117. Roehling, supra note 67, at 177. R 
118. See Butterfield v. New York, No. 96 Civ. 5144, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18676, 
at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1998) (fellow officers refused to line up next to complainant 
and supervisors did nothing to correct the behavior); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car 
Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (top-earning salesman was 
blamed for high turnover in his office because “of his size and appearance”). 
119. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. R 
120. See infra note 127 and sources cited. R 
121. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (“The objective 
of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifi­
able group of [ ] employees over other employees.”).  It is an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify” his employees in any way that 
deprives them of employment opportunities or adversely affects their status as employ­
ees.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2006). 
122. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) 
(quoting Senator Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 6547, 6548 (1964)) (finding that “the 
plight of the Negro in our economy” was Congress’s motivation in prohibiting race 
discrimination through Title VII).  Before 1964, African Americans were relegated to 
“unskilled and semi-skilled” jobs. Id.  Due to automation, the number of available jobs 
was decreasing, which created a serious unemployment issue. Id.  In 1962, the nonwhite 
unemployment rate was 124% higher than the white rate. Id. 
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tive protection.123  In this respect, discrimination against fat people 
shares many of the characteristics of the types of discrimination that 
have found remedy under civil rights laws.124 
The purpose of Title VII is to ensure that merit, not bias, is the 
basis of employment decisions with regard to employees125—the 
presumption being that, once society is “blinded” to differences, 
people have an equal chance to succeed based on a fair assessment 
of their abilities.126  However, because weight is not currently pro­
tected under federal or most state law, employers may lawfully dis­
criminate against qualified individuals based on their weight.  This 
lack of legal protection leaves many people vulnerable to discrimi­
nation and goes against the national policy of equal employment 
opportunity.127 
Preventing weight from being factored into employment deci­
sions when it is unrelated to job performance supports the principle 
of equal employment opportunity.  Nancy Parolisi was a 221-pound 
substitute teacher who was denied her license solely on the basis of 
her weight.128  Despite having an excellent performance record for 
three years, the Board of Examiners denied Parolisi’s petition be­
cause her weight deviated more than forty percent from their 
adopted standards of health and physical fitness.129  The court held 
that this “mathematical computation,” and its subsequent errone­
ous result, had no relation to Parolisi’s ability to perform the duties 
of the job.130 
123. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 111-12.  “[W]hat differentiates sex from such R 
non-suspect statuses . . . and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex 
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to soci­
ety.”  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
124. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 113; see supra notes 109-118 and accompanying R 
text. 
125. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 134.  “A primary purpose of Title VII is to pro- R 
hibit discriminatory practices in employment.”  Mich. Dep’t of Civil Rights v. Horizon 
Tube Fabricating, Inc., 385 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Ford Motor 
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982)). 
126. KIRKLAND, supra note 95, at 12. R 
127. Marks v. Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(holding that “discrimination based on weight alone . . . does not violate Title VII, 
unless issues of race, religion, sex, or national origin are intertwined”); Elizabeth E. 
Theran, Legal Theory on Weight Discrimination, in WEIGHT  BIAS: NATURE, CONSE­
QUENCES, AND  REMEDIES, supra note 109, at 195, 202 (concluding cases cannot be R 
brought under Title VII if they involve discrimination only on the basis of weight). 
128. Parolisi v. Bd. of Exam’rs, 285 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (Sup. Ct. 1967). 
129. Id. at 937-38. 
130. Id. at 938. 
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The only available federal law available to Parolisi was Title 
VII, which offered no direct protection from discrimination based 
on weight.131  The Board claimed weight that deviated from “nor­
mal” posed a safety threat to the teacher and her students and that 
obese people were generally prone to certain medical conditions, 
which would inevitably lead to absences.132  Because the Board’s 
findings were generalizations and not specific to the petitioner, the 
court determined the Board’s “guesswork” about Parolisi’s capabil­
ities was “arbitrary and capricious” and in violation of the state 
constitution.133 
If Parolisi’s weight somehow diminished her ability to perform 
her job, the court acknowledged that the Board might have been 
justified in denying her license.134  However, “obesity, standing 
alone, [was] not reasonably and rationally related to the ability to 
teach or to maintain discipline.”135  The court also noted the lack of 
rejected petitions for male teachers based on their weight, inferring 
an aesthetic standard as opposed to a standard of merit and fitness; 
this deferential treatment may have been grounds for protection 
under Title VII as sex discrimination.136  Federal protection proved 
to be unnecessary as Parolisi was able to prevail on her claim under 
state law.137  Without the support of state law, however, she would 
have been legally banned from working in a position she was fully 
capable of performing, and had performed to a degree of excel­
lence, simply based on her weight. 
Title VII could incorporate weight if an employment decision 
based on weight resulted in the disparate treatment or disparate 
impact on members of a protected class.138  Weight requirements 
have been deemed violations of Title VII where they have an ineq­
uitable impact on women.139  For example, weight regulations im­
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006); see supra note 127 and sources cited. R 
132. Parolisi, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 939. 
133. N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 6.  The State Constitution required that individuals be 
tested on their own particular abilities to perform the duties of the job. Parolisi, 285 
N.Y.S.2d at 937. 
134. Parolisi, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 940. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. (holding the standards the Board used to determine “merit and fitness” 
violated N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 6). 
138. Roehling, supra note 44, at 988; see supra notes 5-6 (discussing disparate R 
treatment and disparate impact). 
139. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-32 (1977) (holding that 
Alabama’s height and weight standards for correctional counselors were discriminatory 
because they excluded over forty percent of the female population while only excluding 
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posed by Continental Airlines on its flight hostesses were found 
discriminatory because they applied only to female employees.140 
The key consideration was whether the regulation imposed an 
equal burden on both sexes.141  The policy was found to be facially 
discriminatory on the basis of sex and the weight requirements were 
not bona fide occupational qualifications.142  Thus, the employees 
were protected under Title VII.  Although weight was not itself a 
protected characteristic under federal law, the employees were inci­
dentally protected from being discriminated against on the basis of 
weight because of the disparate impact the regulations had on the 
female workers.143  Because weight discrimination requires this 
type of “plus” claim144 to be protected under Title VII, the federal 
law is inadequate to directly protect victims of weight bias in the 
workplace. 
B. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Victims of weight discrimination are also generally unsuccess­
ful in claiming their obesity is a disability under federal law.  One of 
the few court decisions to acknowledge obesity as a disability is 
Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, 
and Hospitals.145  Bonnie Cook was rejected for an institutional at­
tendant position she had successfully held twice before.146  During a 
less than one percent of the male population); Hardy v. Stumpf, 112 Cal. Rptr. 739, 743­
44 (Ct. App. 1974) (noting that eighty percent of women were excluded from employ­
ment consideration under the requirement that police department applicants be five-
foot-seven and one hundred and thirty-five pounds). 
140. Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1982) (en 
banc).  A similar position exclusively held by men did not have the same requirements; 
thus, it constituted sex discrimination. Id. at 604. 
141. Id. at 606. 
142. Id. at 608.  A “bona fide occupational qualification” is a qualification that is 
“reasonably necessary to the normal operation” or essence of an employer’s business. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006); Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
143. Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 610.  Continental wanted to offer customers service by 
slender, attractive flight hostesses to better compete in the market, not because the 
weight affected the employees’ job performance. Id. at 608-09. 
144. See supra note 8 and cases cited. R 
145. Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st 
Cir. 1993).  See William C. Taussig, Weighing in Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook 
v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the 
Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans 
With Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. REV. 927 (1994), for a discussion of this case. 
146. Cook, 10 F.3d at 20.  Cook left the position voluntarily on both occasions, 
with a “spotless work record.” Id.  The defendant conceded that she “met its legitimate 
expectations” with regard to her past performance. Id. 
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routine pre-hire physical, Cook, five-foot-four and 320 pounds, was 
categorized as “morbidly obese,” but the nurse did not find any lim­
itations that would prevent her from performing the duties of her 
job.147  Nonetheless, the Department of Mental Health, Retarda­
tion, and Hospitals (MHRH) refused to hire her for two reasons: 
concerns she would not be able to evacuate patients because of her 
limited mobility and fears that her condition heightened her risk for 
heart disease, which would lead to worker’s compensation claims 
and absenteeism.148 
Cook sued under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which 
prohibits federally assisted programs from discriminating against 
otherwise qualified individuals solely on the basis of their disabil­
ity.149  To be considered “disabled” under the RHA, a person actu­
ally has to have, or be regarded as having, “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi­
ties.”150  Cook pursued a “perceived disability theory,” claiming 
that while she was fully able, the employer viewed her as disabled 
because of a physical impairment, defined as “any physiological dis­
order or condition . . . affecting a major bodily system.”151  To pre­
vail, Cook had to demonstrate that she either (1) had a physical 
impairment, but it did not substantially limit her ability to perform 
major life activities,152 or (2) that she did not have a physical im­
pairment.153  She also had to prove the facility treated her as though 
she was impaired (regardless of whether the impairment was actual 
or perceived) and substantially limited in one or more of her major 
life activities.154 
The court found that the Rehabilitation Act’s “perceived disa­
bility model can be satisfied whether or not a person actually has a 
physical or mental impairment” and that the definition of impair­
ment was broad.155  Cook offered expert testimony that claimed 
morbid obesity was a physiological disorder affecting various body 
systems, which satisfied the definition of “physical impairment.”156 
147. Id. at 20-21. 
148. Id. at 21. 
149. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). 
150. Id. § 705(9)(B). 
151. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A)). 
152. “Major life activities” includes working.  45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2009). 
153. Cook, 10 F.3d at 23. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 22. 
156. Id. at 23. 
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Because there was direct evidence157 that MHRH did not hire 
Cook because of her weight, the court found that MHRH improp­
erly treated Cook as though she were handicapped in this re­
spect.158  The court held that MHRH’s stereotyping was “exactly 
the sort of employment decision that the Rehabilitation Act seeks 
to banish.”159  Despite this decision, most courts have not followed 
the First Circuit in recognizing obesity—morbid or otherwise—as a 
disability within the meaning of the federal disability statutes.160 
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) models 
itself after the Rehabilitation Act and was also “passed to ensure 
that merit, rather than bias, was used for judging people with disa­
bilities.”161  Employers are prohibited from discriminating against 
any “qualified individual with a disability.”162  A “qualified individ­
ual” means a person  who can perform the essential functions of the 
job with or without reasonable accommodation.163  A disability 
could be “a record of such an impairment,” or a person could be 
“regarded as having such an impairment.”164 
In interpreting the ADA, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) regulations have distinguished conditions 
that are impairments and physical conditions that are not impair­
ments, such as weight “within ‘normal’ range” and weight that is 
157. See infra note 190 (defining direct evidence). R 
158. Cook, 10 F.3d at 23. 
159. Id. at 27. 
160. See supra note 11 and cases cited for a discussion of courts rejecting obesity R 
as a protected disability. 
161. KELLY, supra note 61, at 146.  One purpose of the ADA was “to provide a R 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006). 
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).  The definition of “disability” is the same under both 
the ADA and the RHA. See supra text accompanying note 150. R 
163. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
164. Id. § 12102(2)(B)-(C).  In EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, a bus driver applicant 
that was observed “waddling” down the hall was disqualified by the examining physi­
cian because he assumed she would not be able to “move swiftly” to evacuate passen­
gers.  EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 967-68 (S.D. Tex. 1996).  The court 
found this disqualification impermissible, holding an “individual rejected from a job 
because of the ‘myths, fears, and stereotypes’ associated with” a disability would fall 
within the “regarded as” prong of the statute. Id. at 975-77. 
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not “the result of a physiological disorder.”165  The regulations state 
that “except in rare circumstances, obesity is not [covered].”166 
In EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., the EEOC argued that 
morbid obesity, regardless of cause, demonstrated an impair­
ment.167  The court disagreed, declining to extend the definition of 
impairment under the ADA to “all ‘abnormal’ (whatever that term 
may mean) physical characteristics.”168  The EEOC also argued 
that, even if morbid obesity is not considered an impairment for the 
purposes of the ADA, the employee should be protected because 
his employer perceived him to be disabled.169  The court held that 
to do so would make the “regarded as” prong of the ADA a “catch­
all cause of action for discrimination based on appearance, size, and 
any number of other things far removed from the reasons the stat­
utes were passed.”170 
An estimated ninety-eight percent of disability discrimination 
lawsuits under the ADA are decided in favor of the employer.171 
For the claimant, an obesity disability claim is a catch-22.172  He 
must demonstrate an impairment that substantially limits his major 
life activity of working but at the same time show that his disability 
does not prevent him from being able to perform the job.173  As a 
result, case interpretations of weight-based discrimination based on 
disability law have been inconsistent.174 
165. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (2009). 
166. Id. app. § 1630.2(j); see Smaw v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 
1474-75 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that the ADA indicates that, generally, obesity does 
not qualify as a disability). 
167. EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2006). 
168. Id. at 443. 
169. Id. at 440. 
170. Id. at 443 (citing Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 
1997)). 
171. Carmichael, supra note 1; see, e.g., Francis, 129 F.3d 281 (affirming lower R 
court ruling for employer); Smaw, 862 F. Supp. 1469 (granting summary judgment for 
employer); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987) (af­
firming lower court on employment discrimination while reversing on wrongful termi­
nation for “retaliatory discharge for seeking workers compensation”). 
172. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 744 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
173. Id. at 744 (holding plaintiff’s excess muscle from bodybuilding disqualified 
him from satisfying company weight regulations, even though he was capable and quali­
fied to perform the duties required); see also Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 
1143, 1154 (Cal. 1993) (where plaintiff lost her case because she argued her weight was 
not a hindrance to her job performance even though it was perceived as such by her 
potential employer). 
174. In Berkeley, CA, an hour away from where Cassista lost her case, John Rossi 
argued his weight was a disability and his employer perceived him as disabled; he won a 
million dollars in damages. See SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 154. R 
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The recent amendments to the ADA could potentially broaden 
its available protection.  The amendments rejected restrictive judi­
cial interpretations of the “substantially limits” standard175 and 
added new definitions of “major life activities.”176  In addition to 
working, employees could now be considered disabled if any of the 
following activities are restricted by their obesity: “caring for one­
self, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, 
reading, concentrating, thinking, [or] communicating.”177  While the 
amendments may help lessen the burden of proving obesity is a dis­
ability under the ADA, its current interpretation demonstrates that 
it is unlikely, and therefore inadequate, to protect against weight 
discrimination in employment. 
III. WEIGHT AS A PROTECTED ANTIDISCRIMINATION CATEGORY 
Despite the inadequacies of federal law, parties have success­
fully litigated weight-discrimination claims under broad interpreta­
tions of state civil rights and disability statutes.178  The success of 
these cases supports the theory that state legislation like Massachu­
setts’s proposed H.R. 1850 is the most effective way to offer legisla­
tive aid.  Instead of trying to fit weight discrimination into federal 
laws that were not designed to accommodate this kind of claim, the 
better alternative is to create new legal options through state 
laws.179  Legislation like H.R. 1850 addresses the issue directly, pro­
viding a legal basis for discrimination based on weight.180  This 
eliminates many of the obstacles weight discrimination claims cur­
rently face.  For example, H.R. 1850 does away with the need to 
prove an underlying medical condition for a federal disability 
175. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)-(b), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3554.  Congress found that the term “substantially limits” had been inter­
preted by the Supreme Court “to require a greater degree of limitation than was in­
tended by Congress.” Id. § 2(a)(7). 
176. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2). 
177. Id. 
178. See generally Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. McDermott v. Xerox 
Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985). 
179. Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 800. R 
180. Section 4 of Chapter 151B and Section 98 of Chapter 272 of the Massachu­
setts General Laws would be amended to add “height” and “weight” to the categories 
of unlawful forms of discrimination for employment, housing, and public accommoda­
tions.  H.R. 1850, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009). 
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claim181 and eliminates an additional level of discrimination based 
on sex, race, religion, age, or national origin for a federal civil rights 
violation.182 
Creating direct protection for weight would offer the states 
clear legal guidance and consistency in the courtroom.  It would 
also support the congressional goal of equal employment opportu­
nity by removing weight as a consideration for employment deci­
sions unless weight is a bona fide occupational qualification.183  It is 
much more logical and effective to ban weight-based discrimination 
outright than to distort weight into a disability or a “plus” claim. 
Weight protection would therefore properly apply an existing legal 
standard—one that protects citizens who have been wrongly pre­
vented from equal employment opportunities because of negative, 
stereotypical beliefs.  Weight protection would also affirm the socie­
tal principle that all citizens deserve to be treated fairly by being 
assessed based on their individual abilities. 
A. Protecting Weight Under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act 
The sole model for Massachusetts is Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen 
Act, which added height and weight to its antidiscrimination law to 
counteract those characteristics being used as proxies for other 
forms of discrimination.184  Body size was included as part of a com­
prehensive antidiscrimination policy because height and weight 
characteristics “tend to be linked to certain ethnic groups or to wo­
men.”185  Michigan courts modeled their decisions in accordance 
with Title VII,186 using existing burden-of-proof frameworks as gui­
dance to establish the necessary elements of weight 
discrimination.187 
181. See supra note 11 for examples of courts requiring that obesity be caused by R 
a physiological condition to be considered a disability. 
182. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the protection of weight only when there R 
is additional discrimination based on a protected characteristic. 
183. See supra note 142 (defining bona fide occupational qualification). R 
184. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2101 (West 2001).  Women who were kept 
out of traditional male jobs by minimum weight requirements used the Elliott-Larsen 
Act for protection against this discrimination, resulting in equal employment opportuni­
ties for those positions. KIRKLAND, supra note 95, at 44. R 
185. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 245 (quoting Ombudsman Artstihe of the Michi- R 
gan Department of Civil Rights). 
186. See Mich. Dep’t of Civil Rights v. Horizon Tube Fabricating, Inc., 385 
N.W.2d 685, 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
187. Kristen, supra note 30, at 102.  In analyzing cases under the Elliott-Larsen R 
Act, the courts have used two burden-of-proof tests.  The McDonnell Douglas test re­
quires a plaintiff to prove that a prima facie showing of discrimination exists by a pre­
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Since weight is a protected characteristic under the Elliott-Lar­
sen Act,188 claimants need only prove a prima facie case189 or offer 
direct evidence190 of weight discrimination to qualify for statutory 
protection.  There is no additional burden of needing to attach 
weight discrimination to “plus” claims under Title VII, and it elimi­
nates the debate of whether obesity should be classified as a disabil­
ity under the ADA.  Weight is protected as a stand-alone 
characteristic. 
Claimants must also prove that weight was one of the motivat­
ing factors for the alleged discriminatory employment decision.191 
For example, when Marian Caskey was laid off, her employer re­
quired her to undergo a physical examination as a condition of be­
ing recalled.192  Although she was deemed physically able to 
resume work, the employer stated she would first have to lose 125 
pounds.193  The Civil Rights Commission found that the employer 
had “unlawfully failed and refused to recall claimant because of her 
weight.”194 
ponderance of the evidence.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973).  The burden then shifts to the defendant to put forth a legitimate, nondiscrimi­
natory reason for its actions. Id.  If successful, the burden reverts back to the plaintiff 
to show the reasons were merely pretext for the discrimination. Id. at 802, 805.  The 
Gallaway test only requires the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing and the em­
ployer to prove a legitimate reason.  Gallaway v. Chrysler Corp., 306 N.W.2d 368, 371 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981); see also Thom, supra note 30, at 1239. R 
188. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2101; see supra note 30 and sources cited. R 
189. A prima facie case is established when the plaintiff proves by a preponder­
ance of the evidence that she was qualified for the position but rejected under circum­
stances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802; Thom, supra note 30, at 1239.  To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff R 
must first show she is a member of a statutorily protected group. MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (holding plaintiff had to 
show he was a member of a racial minority). 
190. Direct evidence “requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at 
least a motivating factor.”  Lamoria v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 584 N.W.2d 589, 593 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting Harrison v. Olde Fin. Corp., 572 N.W.2d 
679, 683 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)), adopted, 593 N.W.2d 699 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (spe­
cial panel). 
191. Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 286, 291 (E.D. Mich. 1993); see also 
Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 687 F. Supp. 1115, 1124 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that a jury 
could reasonably conclude that plaintiff’s weight was a factor in her termination based 
on the requirement that she submit documentation to her employer regarding medical 
treatment for obesity). 
192. Mich. Dep’t of Civil Rights v. Horizon Tube Fabricating, Inc., 385 N.W.2d 
685, 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
193. Id. 
194. Id.  Other “employees with less seniority were being recalled” before her, 
presumably without conditions attached. Id.  The appellate court found that the defen­
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Likewise, Barbara Lamoria’s supervisor was shown to have 
“made critical and harsh remarks” about “heavy people” that led 
one of Lamoria’s co-workers to believe Lamoria would be fired.195 
The court considered these hostile remarks akin to racial slurs and 
“evidence of animus” of a characteristic protected from discrimina­
tion and an indication that the person who made the remarks may 
discriminate on that basis.196  Lamoria also presented evidence that 
two other overweight employees were fired or forced to resign 
under this supervisor’s watch.197  Because Lamoria had “directly 
prove[n]” her weight was a determinative factor in her employer’s 
decision to discharge her, the court held that she had established a 
claim of weight discrimination.198 
A plaintiff “must [also] present credible, direct evidence of 
wrongful discrimination” that is not “based on rumors, conclusory 
allegations, or subjective beliefs,” nor “vague, ambiguous, or iso­
lated remarks.”199  Wayne Hein, a 200-pound truck driver, believed 
his termination was the result of weight discrimination because his 
co-workers called him derogatory names, and his supervisor made 
fun of him in a cartoon caption.200  However, the court did not find 
the alleged prejudice played a part in his termination.201  In Byrnes 
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the court found that an isolated comment about 
an obese employee’s weight was not enough to establish that weight 
discrimination played a part in his replacement.202  Despite being 
told he needed to lose weight “if he wanted to go anywhere with 
the company”203 and a manager threatening to fire him if he did not 
lose weight, the employee remained with the company for eighteen 
years and was repeatedly promoted.204  After he had been on medi­
dant did not prove that claimant failed to mitigate her damages from the loss of em­
ployment and upheld the lower court’s award for attorneys’ fees. Id. at 688-89. 
195. Lamoria, 584 N.W.2d at 595. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 594. 
199. Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 2000). 
200. Id. at 484-85. 
201. Id. at 489.  Hein was terminated for refusing to work on a job that would 
have required him to be out of town when his blood pressure medication ran out. Id. at 
484.  He could have had the prescription refilled in advance but failed to do so. See id. 
at 486. 
202. Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 286, 292 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
203. Id. at 289. 
204. Id. at 288. 
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cal leave for only four months, the company replaced him, citing 
the need to have the position filled.205 
Because the Elliott-Larsen Act includes weight as a protected 
characteristic, direct legal protection and remedies are available for 
individuals who can prove weight played a part in their employer’s 
discriminatory decision.  This protection creates an equal legal play­
ing field for applicants and employees to be assessed on their mer­
its, not their appearance, in accordance with the purpose of 
antidiscrimination law.  If passed, H.R. 1850 would offer the same 
level of legal protection as the Elliot-Larsen Act, creating a state­
wide prohibition against discrimination based on weight in the 
workplace.206 
B. Protecting Weight as Social Legislation 
Weight was added to the Elliott-Larsen Act to “prevent[ ] dis­
crimination directed against a person because of that person’s 
membership in a certain class and to eliminate the effects of offen­
sive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.”207  If H.R. 
1850 were to pass in Massachusetts, other states would be en­
couraged to pass similar legislation.208  This kind of “remedial social 
legislation”209 not only ensures that employee evaluations remain 
focused on employee merits and not measurements, but it also as­
sists in the mental shift that will need to take place before the issue 
of obesity is ever successfully addressed. 
Like Title VII, state civil rights laws are intended to be reme­
dies for unlawful discrimination,210 and, as such, they are “deserv­
ing of a liberal construction”211 in order to accomplish this 
important social goal.  In Gimello v. Agency, the New Jersey Supe­
rior Court stated that the specific purpose of its civil rights law, the 
Law Against Discrimination (LAD), “was to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination in employment based on a person’s physical 
205. Id. at 289. 
206. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. R 
207. Neal v. Dep’t of Corr., 583 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
208. Puhl, supra note 82.  In 1989, Massachusetts became the second state to pass R 
legislation protecting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2008); Kubilis, supra note 24, at 215.  The bill had faced R 
opposition and been defeated for seventeen years prior to its passage. Id. 
209. Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991) (quoting Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 802 (N.J. 1988)). 
210. Id. at 274. 
211. Id. at 276 (quoting Clowes, 538 A.2d at 802). 
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makeup.”212  Gimello’s obesity would probably not have been con­
sidered a handicap under the ADA, but the state court was able to 
use a broader definition of disability to encompass the plaintiff’s 
condition in order to protect him from discrimination based on his 
weight.213  The New York Human Rights Law has also been 
broadly interpreted to find a complainant’s obesity constituted a 
disability within the meaning of the statute.214  The Court of Ap­
peals held that the “conclusion that obesity itself can constitute an 
impairment was a reasonable, commonsense interpretation of the 
statute.”215 
On the other hand, the California Supreme court in Cassista v. 
Community Foods, Inc. held that the plaintiff’s obesity was not a 
handicap under the state’s Fair Employment and Housing Act,216 
demonstrating the inconsistency that occurs as a result of not hav­
ing direct protection for weight in state legislation.217  The court 
noted its task was “to define ‘physical handicap’” within the bound­
aries “which the Legislature intended,” not “in terms [it] believe[d] 
to be morally just or socially desirable.”218  This holding reflects the 
same judicial limitations of protecting weight discrimination found 
in the federal context, where obesity is not considered a disability 
within the meaning of the statute and, therefore, cannot be pro­
tected.219  The court’s distinction between its obligation to uphold 
the law as intended by Congress, and the decision it could have 
made had the statute accommodated weight, could be interpreted 
as a call upon the legislature for direct weight discrimination pro­
tection.  Considering the fact that a local ordinance was passed in 
response to the Cassista court’s inability to find weight discrimina­
212. Gimello, 594 A.2d at 276 (citing Clowes, 538 A.2d at 794); see N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 10:5-5q (West 2002). 
213. Gimello, 594 A.2d at 276. 
214. State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 
695, 698 (N.Y. 1985); see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 [21] (McKinney 2005). 
215. McDermott, 480 N.E.2d at 697. 
216. CAL. GOV. CODE § 12900 (2005). 
217. Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Cal. 1993) (holding that 
under the state’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, weight could qualify as a pro­
tected “handicap” or “disability” if it was a physiological condition that affected one or 
more of the basic bodily systems and limited a major life activity, but that the plaintiff 
did not establish that situation in this case). 
218. Id. at 1146-47. 
219. Id. at 1153.  Despite prima facie evidence that weight was a primary reason 
why Cassista was not hired, she lost because she argued she was not handicapped. Id. 
at 1154. 
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tion unlawful,220 it is a clear demonstration that states could, and 
should, pass legislation that includes weight as a protected 
characteristic. 
Banning weight discrimination has kept qualified employees 
working and it has forced employers to change discriminatory com­
pany policies, furthering the national goal of equal employment op­
portunity.221  The few places in the country that do have weight 
discrimination laws have, in fact, seen evidence of that social 
change.  In San Francisco, for example, fat activists protested a fit­
ness center billboard that featured a picture of a space alien with a 
caption that read, “When they come they’ll eat the fat ones first.”222 
The San Francisco Human Rights Commission took notice, edu­
cated itself about the lack of legal protection for obese people, and 
held a hearing where it heard testimony about weight-based dis­
crimination experienced in employment, housing, and health care 
situations.223  Based on this hearing, the Commission voted unani­
mously to prohibit discrimination based on height or weight.224 
If weight discrimination plaintiffs had the protection afforded 
under the Elliott-Larsen Act and the few local ordinances availa­
ble,225 the outcome of these cases may have been decidedly differ­
ent.  Toni Cassista may have worked at Community Foods without 
issue,226 Joseph Gimello’s supervisor would not have been allowed 
to fire a highly successful sales manager,227 and skilled customer 
service representatives might actually represent the customers they 
220. SANTA  CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE, ch. 9.83 (1992), available at http:// 
www.codepublishing.com/CA/SantaCruz/; SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 233. R 
221. Kristen, supra note 30, at 102.  Both Continental and United Airlines R 
changed their employee weight requirements as a result of litigation. See Frank v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2000); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 
692 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc).  Jazzercise acknowledged the “value of ‘fit 
appearance’ as a standard [was] debatable” as a result of the Portnick controversy. 
Elizabeth Fernandez, Exercising Her Right to Work: Fitness Instructor Wins Weight-Bias 
Fight, S.F. CHRON., May 7, 2002, at A1. 
222. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 236. R 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 237. 
225. See SANTA  CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE, 92-11 ch. 9.83; District of Columbia 
Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11 (LexisNexis 2001). 
226. Toni was twice rejected for a job with Community Foods, Inc.  Cassista v. 
Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Cal. 1993). 
227. Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 265-66 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
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serve.228  In this respect, Massachusetts should add height and 
weight to existing antidiscrimination laws to further the goal of en­
suring equal employment opportunities for its citizens.  Despite this 
goal, however, the legislature does have its opposition. 
C. Arguments Against H.R. 1850 
1. Employer Autonomy 
Traditionally, legislators and courts have supported private em­
ployers’ rights to choose their employees as long as they apply the 
same job requirements equally, and their employment decisions 
and practices are not unlawfully discriminatory.229  The Supreme 
Court has stated, 
By its terms, the ADA allows employers to prefer some physical 
attributes over others and to establish physical criteria.  An em­
ployer runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an employment de­
cision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or 
imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life 
activity.  Accordingly, an employer is free to decide that physical 
characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level 
of an impairment-such as one’s height, build, or singing voice-are 
preferable to others, just as it is free to decide that some limiting, 
but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less 
than ideally suited for a job.230 
Because excess weight is considered a “physical characteristic” 
like eye color, it has not risen to the level of requiring legal discrim­
228. See Marks v. Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999); Phila. Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 448 A.2d 701, 702-03 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1982). 
229. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“It is hereby de­
clared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by protecting the exercise by workers of 
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their 
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ­
ment or other mutual aid or protection.”).  The Act proscribes the exercise of the right 
to hire and fire only when it is employed as a discriminatory device.  NLRB v. Audio 
Indus., Inc., 313 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 1963). 
230. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490-91 (1999), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; see also 
EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2006); Marks, 72 F. 
Supp. 2d at 330 (holding that employers may take weight or other physical characteris­
tics into consideration); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746-47 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984); Phila. Elec. Co., 448 A.2d at 708 (“It has always been the rule that an em­
ployer may be selective about the persons he employs as long as he does not unlawfully 
discriminate among the applicants.”). 
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ination protection without an underlying medical origin.231  With­
out proof of a medical origin, weight could be used as a basis for 
expanding disability legislation to cover those who could control 
their weight through diet, exercise, or medication, which is outside 
the scope of the law’s intention, and it could subject employers to 
costly discrimination lawsuits. 
The freedom employers enjoy to choose their own employees 
must be balanced against the employee’s right to be free from dis­
crimination, however.  “The essence of discrimination [has been de­
fined] as the formulation of opinions about others not on their 
individual merits, but on their membership in a class with assumed 
characteristics.”232  Currently protected characteristics, such as race 
and sex, were given legal shelter because minorities and women 
were misjudged collectively as a group, negatively affecting their 
employment opportunities.233  Likewise, the pervasive and consis­
tent negative stereotypes surrounding obese people demonstrate 
that heavier workers are also misjudged as a group and suffer the 
same loss of equitable opportunities in the workplace.234  There­
fore, the same standards that have been used to render discrimina­
tion unlawful based on other irrelevant characteristics should also 
be applied to weight. 
Some employers have used the rationale that their employ­
ment practices are based on business decisions.  For example, an 
airline’s practice of only hiring thin hostesses as a competitive mea­
sure was found to be unlawful discrimination.235  Inherent to this 
hiring practice was the assumption that, to be attractive, a person 
must not exceed a certain weight, and that customers preferred at­
231. The appendix to the federal regulations, which defines “impairment” for the 
purposes of the ADA, describes weight as a “physical characteristic” and, therefore, 
does not contemplate weight as a protected trait within the meaning of the statute.  29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (2009); see also Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 
281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that to hold weight as anything other than a physical 
characteristic would open the door to a range of traits not meant to be covered by the 
ADA and RHA); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
“physical characteristics that are ‘not the result of a physiological disorder’ are not con­
sidered ‘impairments’ for determining either actual or perceived disability” (quoting 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h))). 
232. Gimello, 594 A.2d at 278 (quoting Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 
541 A.2d 682, 689 (N.J. 1988)). 
233. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. R 
234. Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 789.  Participants who had negative im- R 
pressions of obese workers stated the obesity directly led to their judgments. Id. 
235. Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
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tendants “who conform[ed] to a traditional image.”236  The court 
stated, “It has long been established . . . that passengers’ preference 
. . . cannot justify discriminatory airline hiring policies.”237 
The same aesthetic prejudice has been used to keep qualified 
workers from other jobs that require customer interaction,238 creat­
ing a “place” for obese workers much like the inferior status minor­
ities and women were historically relegated to in society.239 
Allowing this practice reinforces the “formidable barriers to em­
ployment” by a society that “all too often confuses ‘slim’ with 
‘beautiful’ or ‘good.’”240  In the same way customer preferences are 
not allowed to dictate the acceptable image of the employee, an 
employer should not be able to make discriminatory aesthetic 
choices when appearance is not relevant to the job.  Critics of the 
Massachusetts bill have argued if weight is legally protected, legisla­
tion will have to extend to all types of physical characteristics.241 
However, this is too broad of a conclusion considering the lack of 
documented evidence that employees are experiencing the same 
barriers to employment because of hair or eye color discrimination 
to the same extent that employees are being discriminated against 
based on their weight.  If those characteristics result in the level of 
employment discrimination currently experienced by obese work­
ers, they may be right. 
2. The Cost of Obesity 
One of the strongest arguments employers have asserted when 
considering weight in employment decisions is the associated costs 
relating to obesity.242  “Obesity accounts for a large share of the . . . 
costs of employee healthcare,” which thirty-eight percent of U.S. 
CEOs cite as “a major obstacle to expanding their . . . 
workforces.”243  Overweight and obese adults have a higher risk of 
236. Id. 
237. Id.  The weight limitations had no bearing on the individual’s ability to do 
the job, nor did Continental attempt to hire only thin males, rendering its employment 
practice discriminatory. Id. at 608-09. 
238. See supra note 49 for discussion of customer service jobs. R 
239. Employment Discrimination, supra note 105, at 1167. R 
240. Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 28 
(1st Cir. 1993). 
241. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for a discussion about the fear R 
of increased meritless litigation. 
242. THE CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 91, at 6-10. R 
243. Id. at 6-7. 
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health problems,244 which contributes to absenteeism and lost 
productivity.245 
The courts have allowed employers to reject overweight em­
ployees based on those considerations, even if the employee did not 
have health problems.  For example, the termination of an over­
weight fire department communications operator was upheld be­
cause obese employees were “more likely to become disabled 
during employment, to the detriment of the county financially and 
otherwise.”246  The employee’s weight “[did] not have [a] deleteri­
ous effect upon her health or her ability to perform the job in ques­
tion,” but the court held the physical problem did not have to “be 
one which presently would impair the performance of the em­
ployee.”247  In other words, despite the fact that the employee was 
able to perform her job and was in good health, the employer was 
allowed to fire her because of the presumption of future health is­
sues and the potential costs to the employer. 
Similarly, Joyce English, a 341-pound customer-service-repre­
sentative applicant, was deemed “unsuitable” for work because of 
her “abnormal weight,” despite passing all pre-employment tests 
and otherwise demonstrating her fitness.248  “[T]here [was] not 
even a scintilla of evidence” that there was anything wrong with 
her, and “she was perfectly able to do a regular day’s work at all 
times.”249  Prior to the medical exam, the employer “considered 
[her] to be qualified . . . and did not believe that her obesity would 
substantially interfere with her ability to perform the essential func­
tions of the job.”250  After the medical department deemed her a 
“high risk” for health problems, the employer refused to hire her.251 
The court held that the “employer has the inherent right to discrim­
inate among applicants . . . and to eliminate those who have a high 
potential for absenteeism and low productivity.”252  Thus, English, 
244. Id. at 8.  Overweight and obese adults have a higher risk of some cancers, 
Type II diabetes, heart disease, and strokes. Id.; CALL TO ACTION, supra note 21, at 8. R 
245. THE CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 91, at 10; see supra note 92 R 
and accompanying text. 
246. Metro. Dade County v. Wolf, 274 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
247. Id. 
248. Phila. Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 448 A.2d 701, 702-03 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1982). 
249. Id. at 707. 
250. Id. at 705. 
251. Id. at 704. 
252. Id. at 708. 
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an able employee, lost the opportunity to work, and an employer 
lost a potentially valuable employee. 
A court’s consideration of employer costs and applicant or em­
ployee weight is distinguishable in cases where the employee or ap­
plicant has a current medical condition.  For example, an employee 
seeking to transfer to a firefighter position was denied the position 
on the basis of his weight, advanced osteoarthritis of the spine, and 
borderline hypertension.253  The court supported the employer’s 
belief that these physical problems would make the employee “less 
apt to be an efficient, safe, illness-free, and claims-free em­
ployee.”254  Because the nature of the work required taking the em­
ployee’s present health into consideration, weight was properly 
evaluated as a component of the employee’s individual 
qualifications. 
Historically, female employees were also considered more 
costly and less useful than their male counterparts, which served as 
a justification for paying them less for the same work.255  Erroneous 
beliefs that women were physically less capable of doing the same 
work as men and would have higher rates of absenteeism led to the 
prohibition of gender discrimination.256  Similarly, discrimination 
based on the stereotypical perception that obese workers are inher­
ently destined to suffer current or future health issues at the ex­
pense of the employer should be equally invalid.257  The Parolisi 
court seemed to agree, noting that an employer “might as well deny 
a candidate [employment] because of the possibility that the candi­
date (might) meet with an accident in the foreseeable future.”258 
It is inherently discriminatory to require overweight workers to 
prove their fitness and ability when other workers are initially pre­
sumed competent.  Even when negative assumptions about work­
ers’ competence are proven false, employers are still lawfully 
allowed to disqualify them on the basis of their weight.259  Other 
kinds of employees have additional costs associated with them— 
those with families, for example—but there is no evidence to sug­
253. Greene v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981). 
254. Id. 
255. Comment, supra note 107, at 672 n.8. R 
256. Employment Discrimination, supra note 105, at 1168. R 
257. Roehling, supra note 67, at 185-86. R 
258. Parolisi v. Bd. of Exam’rs, 285 N.Y.S.2d 936, 939 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (quoting In 
re Warner, 1 Ed. Dept. Rep. 58 #6460 (June 11, 1968)). 
259. See, e.g., Roehling, supra note 44, at 980.  A survey of employers found R 
15.9% determined obesity to be “an absolute bar to” hiring an employee “and 43.9% 
considered obesity conditional medical grounds for not [hiring] an applicant.” Id. 
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gest those expenses are taken into consideration in a way that nega­
tively affects the applicant’s prospects of being hired.260  This 
inequitable treatment places the obese applicant at a substantial 
disadvantage. 
In Michigan and municipalities that include weight in their an­
tidiscrimination laws, “additional organizational costs thought to be 
associated with overweight employees are not [considered] legal 
justification for discriminating against [those] individuals.”261  Pass­
ing legislation like H.R. 1850 would remove the barrier of weight 
consideration, allowing applicants to compete fairly for the job. 
3. Equal Application 
Opponents of H.R. 1850 have questioned the legislation’s 
broad protection for weight and the lack of an underlying medical 
requirement for discrimination protection.262  Without specified 
boundaries, opponents are concerned that any resident would be 
able to file a weight discrimination complaint, including people who 
are considered ideal weight or underweight.263  However, weight 
bias “has the potential to affect every [person] because . . . there is 
no ‘minimum weight requirement’ for discrimination.”264  There­
fore, the remedy should be equally expansive. 
Opponents argue that there is already legislation in place—The 
Americans with Disabilities Act—under which people who feel dis­
criminated against can state their claim.265  There are various con­
cerns, however, with using disability laws to protect employment 
and civil liberties.  Under federal law, “there is no standard for . . . 
how obese a person must be . . . to be considered [disabled]”; only 
morbid obesity has been held to be a handicap.266  The courts have 
supported the idea that “if a physical characteristic is not an ADA 
impairment, an employer is permitted to prefer one physical char­
acteristic over another,” leaving the door open for continued dis­
crimination based on the negative perceptions and stereotypes 
260. Roehling, supra note 67, at 186. R 
261. Id. 
262. See Feldman & Ashton, supra note 29. R 
263. Id. 
264. Theran, supra note 22, at 136. R 
265. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 8. R 
266. Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 800. See generally Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of R 
Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993); Underwood v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that “the difference 
between obesity and overweight is not merely one of semantics” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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associated with the overweight.267  Most people are not heavy 
enough to be considered disabled, nor do they wish to be perceived 
as disabled.268  For a group that already experiences significant bias 
due to their weight, defining this characteristic as a disability only 
serves to create further stigmatization.269  People who have strug­
gled to be accepted argue “that it is not their bodies that cause [the] 
problems,” but, rather, it is the way society treats them—as inferior, 
incompetent, and undeserving—that creates the need for broader 
protection.270  Because weight-based discrimination is not limited to 
a certain-sized individual,271 the legal remedy available through 
H.R. 1850 would need to apply to everyone without restriction. 
4. Mutability 
While it is acknowledged that a history of discrimination has 
created the need for protection based on characteristics like race 
and sex, weight is, arguably, a mutable condition that some feel 
does not rise to the same level.272  However, there is no language in 
the federal statutes requiring immutability as a prerequisite to the 
recognized impairment.273  Whereas race and gender “are under­
stood to be outside the realm of personal choice [and] irrelevant to 
one’s merit and capacities,”274 fat is “a marker of bad character” 
and a condition “people bring on themselves.”275  As a result, some 
believe stigmatizing weight will shame or motivate weight loss; but, 
studies have demonstrated the opposite result: people coping with 
the stigma eat more, refuse to diet, and avoid physical activity, lead­
267. EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 2006). 
268. Carmichael, supra note 1. R 
269. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 129. R 
270. Id. 
271. See supra note 4 and cases cited (reviewing discrimination found in a variety R 
of weight ranges). 
272. Feldman & Ashton, supra note 29.  Two Boston employment attorneys criti- R 
cized the proposed Massachusetts bill for seeking to protect individuals “merely on 
‘weight’—as if weight were immutable and worthy of protected status on par with an 
individual’s race or sex.” Id. 
273. Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 24 
n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding immutability is only relevant when determining the substan­
tiality of physical limitation); cf. Greene v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 
(W.D. Wash. 1981) (holding obesity is not a handicap because it is “not an immutable 
condition such as blindness or lameness”). 
274. Kirkland, supra note 102, at 401. R 
275. Anderson, supra note 29 (quoting Anna Kirkland).  The fact that the obese R 
plaintiff did not appear to suffer from any medical conditions led employer’s physician 
to assume her weight was the result of “bad dietary habits.”  State Div. of Human 
Rights ex rel. McDermott v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. 1985). 
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ing to more health problems and a poorer quality of life.276  And 
while voluntary behavior arguably contributes to a person’s obesity, 
the RHA “contains no language suggesting that its protection is 
linked to how an individual became impaired, or whether an indi­
vidual contributed to his or her impairment.”277 
The erroneous belief that losing weight is simply a matter of 
self-control is rebutted by years of scientific studies that have 
demonstrated that “significant weight loss is a [process that is] diffi­
cult to achieve and sustain over time.”278  Re-categorizing obesity 
to reflect the complexity of its nature279 and reducing the miscon­
ception that it is controllable would benefit the goal of eliminating 
discrimination based on weight.  Re-categorizing obesity could also 
serve to reduce the stigma associated with obesity in the same way 
legislation helped educate society about alcoholism and AIDS, al­
lowing advancement in treatment and prevention.280  Researchers 
have found that “[p]roviding individuals with factual knowledge re­
garding stigmatized groups has, in some instances, improved the at­
titudes towards those groups.”281  Likewise, “[l]egal intervention,” 
such as H.R. 1850, has been deemed “especially appropriate when 
there are no corrective social and moral norms.”282 
CONCLUSION 
“Weight discrimination in the . . . workplace is a [pervasive cir­
cumstance] that has a significant negative impact on the lives of 
[countless] individuals.”283  If allowed to continue, this “ugly condi­
tion in society”284 will continue to “create[ ] a legacy of lost oppor­
tunity for some,” while providing “an unfair advantage for 
276. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. R 
277. Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 809 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Cook, 10 F.3d at 
24) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (noting the RHA’s coverage of alco­
holism, AIDS, diabetes, and cancer from smoking cigarettes). 
278. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 8.  “[D]iets fail 90-98% of the time,” sup- R 
porting the theory that “failure to lose weight does not necessarily correlate with a lack 
of effort or discipline on the part of the dieter.”  Kubilis, supra note 24, at 218. R 
279. There is a growing consensus that the origin of obesity may be indetermin­
able as a medical, genetic, environmental, or behavioral source, potentially altering its 
classification. See sources cited supra note 83. R 
280. RUDD REPORT, supra note 13, at 9. R 
281. Roehling, supra note 83, at 420. R 
282. Wang, supra note 44, at 1920. R 
283. Roehling, supra note 67, at 187. R 
284. Phila. Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 448 A.2d 701, 708 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1982). 
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others.”285  In attempting to pass H.R. 1850, Representative Rush­
ing, like his fellow supporters, believes this bill is a necessary mea­
sure to protect basic human rights.286  Antidiscrimination law is 
rooted in the ideology that “[c]apable people should not be pre­
vented from contributing to the economy and society.”287  There­
fore, everyone is entitled to contribute and, if capable, is expected 
to contribute.  All individuals deserve the same access to employ­
ment opportunities, the right to work and live without harassment, 
and the right to earn an equal amount of pay for their work.288  The 
same ideological arguments supporting other antidiscrimination 
laws apply to the weight-bias discussion.  If the scientific evidence 
that strongly suggests weight is an uncontrollable characteristic in 
many circumstances is accurate, then it is wrong to discriminate 
against people based on that characteristic.289  Excess weight does 
not necessarily render a person incapable, and, as such, people who 
are able to contribute to the economy and society should not be 
prevented from doing so.290  Discrimination is wrong when it im­
pacts a person’s fundamental rights, freedom, or dignity.291  Weight 
discrimination law would provide a legal framework for employers 
and courts to prevent capable individuals from being disadvan­
taged.  It would result in more equitable hiring practices, where 
candidates would be selected based on ability rather than appear­
ance, leading to job retention and increased financial security.  It 
would also “stop people from using weight as a shortcut, a quick 
and dirty way of making stereotypical assessments of a person.”292 
Until weight is brought under the protection of antidiscrimination 
law, employers will be able to legally discriminate on this basis, con­
tributing to the systematic disadvantage of qualified employees at 
all levels of the employment process.  Representative Rushing 
hopes H.R. 1850 will impact society beyond the courthouse, chang­
ing the way overweight people are viewed and treated, so that law­
suits based on discrimination become obsolete.293  In this respect, 
285. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 118. R 
286. See Carmichael, supra note 1. R 
287. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 27. R 
288. Puhl & Brownell, supra note 16, at 801. R 
289. SOLOVAY, supra note 23, at 27. R 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
293. See Carmichael, supra note 1.  H.R. 1850 is currently in the Joint Committee R 
on Workforce and Labor Development.  A public hearing has not yet been scheduled. 
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Massachusetts should add weight to existing antidiscrimination laws 
to further the goals of ensuring equal employment opportunities for 
its citizens. 
Teri Morris 
Email from Tracy Choi, Legislative Aide to Second Assistant Majority Leader Repre­
sentative Byron Rushing, to author (Aug. 20, 2009, 10:32:09 EST, on file with author). 
